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RECRUITMENT, CAREERS AND LEGISLATIVE BEHAVIOR
OF GERMAN PARLIAMENTARIANS, 1848-1953
HEINRICH BEST+
The project presented here shall contribute to the inquiry into
the connection between the character of the social system and the
kind of power-organisation in Germany from the middle of the 19th
century to the early phase of the Federal Republic of Germany . We
plan to gather data on the biographical and career characteristics,
parliamentary voting-behavior, and voting-districts of ca . 5,250
members of national German parliaments between 1848 and 1953.
Therewith methods of collective biography, quantitative voting-
analysis and multi_-level -analysis (in the sense of an applica-
tion of context-variables on the level of the voting-district)
are combined . With this combination of methods, we intend, at
first, to reconstruct the recruitment and legislative behavior of
parliamentary leadership-groups in an empirical density and
temporal depth which have not yet been available in the case of
Germany . In a further step, the findings shall be incorporated
into a comprehensive conception of investigation which can be
expressed in the following research-question : Which structural
properties of the surrounding society and political culture have
determined the capability of parliamentary leadership-groups to
make compromises, to form coalitions and therewith also to gain
power in such a way which, in turn, contributed to the
development, delayed and disturbed by crises, of German parliamentarianism?
The project is being supported by the Deutsche Forschungsge-
meinschaft.
1 . STATE OF RESEARCH
The investigation of parliamentary leadership-groups and decision-
making processes, as a subject of political sociology, has a re-
spectable tradition
. The prominent constitutional position of par-
liaments and the great public attention which has been directed to
their work let the actors in the legislative process
become important objects of social-scientific research quite early. (1) Not in the
Address all communications to : Heinrich Best, Institut für angewandte
Sozialforschung, Greinstr
. 2, 5000 Köln 41 .
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least, the relatively easy accessibility of the information documen-
ted in parliamentary hand-books, protocols, and the public reporting
has also stimulated the scientific interest in this field of re-
search . Today, those theoretical and thematic aspects are important
above all which connect research
concerning parliamentaryleadership -groups with central areas of political sociology . This is true espe-
cially for the three fields of:
- elite analysis - here above all concerning the recruitment and
careers of representatives ; (2)
- the sociology of parties - here above all with respect to the con-
nection between the formation of factions and the forming of par-
ties, as well as to the mediation of intra-party and factional de-
cision-making processes ; (3)
- the theory of decision - here above all with respect to the deter-
mining factors of voting-behavior and formation of factions and
coalitions . (4)
Seen from today, the inquiry into parliaments and parliamentarians
has gained historical depth chiefly through the steady interest in
the object : This has led to an accumulation of research-results,
without eo ipso implying a coherent observation of processes of
change . In addition to this parliaments become an important field
of research for social science history ; not in the least, because
biographies and voting-behavior, also for the past, can be
investigated relatively easily by means of standardized procedures of data
gathering and social-scientific techniques of data analysis . (5)
Certainly the research situation sketched here indicates a relati -
vely steady and intensive occupation with the subject, but still,
remarkably large gaps in research and avoidable methodological and
conceptual limitations are to be noticed . This ascertainment holds,
with some restrictions, for the international state of research ; it
is true, with less reservations, of the situation in the Federal Re-
public of Germany.
Deficiencies are recognicable above all in four areas:
1. Up to now there is very little internationally comparative re-
search in the area of parliamentary leadership-groups
. (6) The
few works with a synchronically comparative perspective restrict
themselves for the most part to the interpretation of marginal
distributions
. More complex methods of analysis were, up until
now, applied only infrequently . In the case of comprehensive com-
parisons of political cultures and elite-systems, parliaments are
only one aspect among many . The restriction to macro-phenomena,
characteristic of such global approaches, had the unavoidable
effect that essential aspects, which are of interest in
connection with the structure of parliamentary leadership-groups and
their behavior, remained bracketed out
. (7) In the area of his-
torical social research, internationally comparative investiga-
tions are completely lacking.
2. The same holds for historically comparative investigation
. The
great number of individual studies has indeed led, in the course
of time, to an accumulation of research-results ; however, these
investigations have been, so far, only seldom connected to cohe-
sive observations . (8) When longer periods were treated cohesive-
ly at all, the traditional historical caesurae - such as revolu-
tions, establishments of constitutions, reforms of voting-rights
and comparable changes of the political system - remained the
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usual lines of division . Over longer spaces of time and convention
nal historical periodizations, change and continuity of
recruitment and of behavior of parliamentary leadership-groups as well
as their connection with changes in other segments of society re-
main a field open to research
. In the meantime, collections of
data exist for the USA, the Netherlands, Denmark, and Norway which,
on the basis of non-aggregated machine-readable data, allow long-
term analyses . (9)
3 : Up until now, the connection between biographical characteristics
of representatives on the one hand and their parliamentary voting-
behavior on the other has rarely been investigated systematically.
In general, collective biography and quantitative voting-analyses
are each used as independent methods
. (10) True, individual demo-
graphical variables are occasionally drawn into quantitative voting
-analyses, but this cannot count as a methodologically satisfactory
combination of both procedures, for the explanatory power of such
"monocausal"
. approaches is, on the whole, slight and the effects of
intervening variables remain untested . Thus in social background
analyses very widely reaching interpretations are deduced from ap-
parent correlations, while the instruments for the control of in-
tervening factors and third variables are only used infrequently
. (11)
4 . Just as unusual aremulti-level analyses
. At the voting-district le-
vel socio-economic sturctural data are, indeed, occasionally em-
ployed as background-variables for analyses of parliamentary
decision-making, but the actual process of the mediation between the pro-
perties of the electorate and the behavior of the actors in the legis-
lative process has still been hardly examined . (12) Here, data on
participation-behavior and the influence of intermediate organisa-
tions on the voting-district level would have to be drawn into the
analyses, in order to arrive at better founded results
. (13)
However, this listing of deficiencies should not obscure the fact that,
in most parliamentary democracies with a developed social-scientific
tradition of research, quantitative voting-analyses and collective
biographies are routinely applied and methodologically highly developed
procedures . This holds true above all for the USA, where the existence
of a specialized journal (Legislative Studies Quarterly), the
establishment of a research-center at the University of Iowa (Comparative Legis-
lative Research Center) and of a Legistative Behavior Network in the
framework of the Social Science History Association can count as indi-
cations of an advanced process of differentiation and institutionali-
zation of this field of research
. Today, biographical core-data and
voting-behavior of American congressmen from 1777 (Continental Congress)
up to the present have been completely prepared in machine-readable
form
. (14) Similarly favorable is the research- and data-situation for
Switzerland, the Netherlands, Denmark and Norway, about whose parlia-
mentary leadership-groups Erich Gruner, Hans Daalder, Mogens N
. Pedersen
and a group of researchers from the NSD have gathered corresponding
data from 1848 (in Norway :1814) up until the present (Switzerland : 1919).
The biographies of the representatives of national Austrian parlia-
ments are presently being machine-readably prepared by Dieter Stiefel
(Wien)
. (15) The parliaments of Japan, Great Britain, France and Italy
Were also intensively examined, with the application of quantitative
collective-biographical procedures and, partly
., voting-analyses of
individual legislature periods
. (16) In these cases too, investiga-
tions were occasionally carried out in great historical depth(e
.g.
Great Britain : Active Members of the House of Commons, 1691-1693),
without, up to now, temporally cohesive sets of data having been put
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out . Even for developing countries with a relatively short and ques-
tionable parliamentary tradition, data-bases are now available (Ghana,
Guinea, Nigeria, Senegal, Tanzania, Korea, Mexico).
The research in the Federal Republic of Germany is, in particular with
respect to investigations with a diachronically comparative perspec-
tive, still hardly developed . With varying degree this holds true for
the formation of theory, the formulation of complex conceptions of
investigation and the application of advanced procedures of analysis
(17), although, however, at least on the point mentioned first a sig-
nificant tradition could be referred to . (18) Characteristic of the
state of research in the Federal Republic is the fact that up until
now there are hardly any works here which investigate legislative be-
havior of German parliamentarians with the methodological repertoire
of quantitative voting-analysis . One reason for this is certainly
that the high factional and coalitional discipline makes the applica-
tion of this instrument to the parliaments of the Federal Republic
not very productive . (19) However, this argument is not valid for the
past up into the years of the Weimar Republic . Up until now in the
USA, Mattheisen, Harris and Loesch have applied these procedures,
with a historically limited interest, to the Frankfurt (20) and
Berlin National Assemblies (21) as well as to the North German (22) and
German Reichstage from 1867 to 1890 . (23) But comprehensive
publications" on the subject were not submitted. The only two German works
which, up until now, have applied the techniques of roll-call-analysis
(Norpoth and Thomas (24)) rest exclusively upon American data and are
to be ordered into the research context of the USA.
Just as clear is the backwardness in the case of the application of
collective-biographical methods . Here the works of W . H . Schröder on
the candidates of the SPD for the Reichstag and the machine-readable
preparation of biographical data of the members of the Prussian House
of Representatives by Bernhard Mann represent isolated exceptions.
(26) The remaining historical works on the subject are too limited
with respect to their regional areas of coverage and investigative
periods of time, and too heterogeneous in their methodological ap-
proaches and posings of the question in order to be connected in a
temporally and spatially comprehensive analysis from social-scientific
perspectives . (26)
In the preparation of the project presented here, first experience
could be gained with the methods
	
of quantitative voting-analysis
on the basis of a set of data on the behavior of the representatives
of the Paulskirche in 52 roll-call votes . This basis of data is being
presently extended to the whole space of time up to the dissolution
of the National Assembly . In spite of the still short space of time
for observation (from June to October 1848) the preliminary results
of this pilot-study allow us to expect a high cognitive potential for
complex procedures of analysis.
Thus a factor - analysis of the voting - behavior showed that
factional loyalties were only one among several determinants of par-
liamentary decision-making processes . One factor, which represents the
structuring of the voting-behavior by factional bonds, has indeed the
greatest weight, but next to it the specific lines of tension of Ger-
many's national process of integration become visible in the voting-
patterns : in decisions concerning the position of the Empire's (cen-
tral) power vis-à-vis the individual states, the integration of
Austria into the Empire, the relationship to ethnic minority-groups
(autonomy of the Polish minority), the relation of state and church,
the treatment of questions with high, national, symbolic significance
- 24 -
(Malmo Armistice) and the defense of the authority of the revolutiona-
ry parliaments of 1848 vis-à-vis the competing, traditional holders of
power, parliamentary group-formations become recognizable which devi-
ate, in part considerably, from the manifest factional structure.
The multi-dimensional scaling of the 52 votes (cf . illustration 1)
yields a similar result : next to two blocks of parliamentary decisions,
which can be classified unambiguously according to a "right-left-di-
mension", further votings are grouped along a dimension "particularist
versus unitarian" . Themes such as the relationship between state and
church, industrial policy, the position of ethnic minorities and rather
moral positions (attitude towards the death-penalty) can be coordinated
neither to the one nor to the other dimension . Despite the still narrow
range of these preliminary findings, it becomes recognizable in a
sketchy manner that in early German parlamentarianism political, econo-
mic, social and cultural constellations of problems immediately in-
fluenced the decision-making processes . The bundeling together of dif-
ferent complexés of questions and the disciplining of representatives
with partially deviating orientations succeeded only incompletely.
This establishes good presuppositions for the application of the pro-
cedures of quantitative voting-analysis.
The first preparatory works are also available in the area of the
diachronic investigation of social and political structures of German
parliaments . Thus, out of the scattered pieces of information of
published statistics, a "social profile" of the representatives of
German parliaments between 1848 and 1976 has been put together. It was the
goal of this rather conventional collection of material to determine
more exactly whether, respectively, in what manner parliamentary lea-
dership-groups can be characterized as cross-sections of different seg-
ments of the elite-system and how the configuration of these cross-
sections changed in the course of time (cf . table 1) . Also from pu-
blished tables, for a series of legislative periods measures of associa-
tion were calculated which represent connections between professional
structure and factional structure and between regional origin of the
representatives (determined by means of the location of the voting-
district) and factional structure . The findings hitherto reveal that,
from the middle of the 19th century up into the Weimar Republic, the
relationship between professional structure and factional membership
became stronger and stronger (cf . table 2) . An occurrence which con-
temporaries interpreted as a mediatisation of the parliament by socio-
economic interest-groups and made essentially responsible for the rela-
tive weakness of the parliaments in the Empire and the Weimar Republic.
(27) As against that the early Bundestage are characterized by a rela-
tively even distribution of representative-professions among the fac-
tions . With respect to the relationship between faction and region
the unexpected finding of a "regionalization", between 1848 and 1871
at first increasing and then until 1912 for the most part unchanging,
of the political sturctures of German parliaments becomes recognizable.
Compared with this, regional factors played only a subordinate role in
the structuring of the parliamentary landscape of the Bundestage (cf.
table 3) .
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These preliminary findings, whose theoretical relevance will be
discussed in the following section, are indeed, presently still too in-
complete and are founded on primary data which are too inconsistent to
make possible a systematic theory-test
. It will be one task of this
project, by means of its own primary surveys, to put together into
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Table 1 : -The social profile of representatives of German parliaments (figures in percent)
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Table 2 : The connection between professional- and
factionalmembership of German parliamentarians (Lambda-values)
Frankfurt National Assembly. 1848/49 0,06
Reichstag 1871 0,08
Average of the Reichstage from 1893 to 1912 0,34
Reichstag 1912 0,41
Weimar National Assembly 0,28
Reichstag 1924 I 0,68
2 . Bundestag 0,14
8 . Bundestag 0,23
Table 3 : The connection between regional origin and factional-
membership of the representatives (Lambda=Values)
Frankfurt National Assembly 0,23
Reichstag 1971 0,43
Reichstag 1881 '0;48
Reichstag 1912 0,441
1 . Bundestag 1949 0,26
2 . Bundestag 1953 0,06
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temporal series these and other indicators in order to grasp the
change of the structure of parliamentary leadership-groups between
1848 and 1953.
2 . THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
The general framework of our theoretical considerations is staked
out by the connection between national integration and the formation
of parliamentary leadership-groups . Thereby we are starting out from
the assumption that, on the presupposition of a competitive process
of selection, the nationally specific constellations and expressions
of social, economic, political and cultural cleavages influence the
recruitment-patterns, factional structures + and decision-makingpro-
cesses of national parliaments and that, on the other hand, the spe-
cific manners of the manifestation of these lines of tension in
parliamentary decision-making then react upon the processes of the for-
mation of nation and state . The assertion of a connection should,
indeed, not imply that parliaments reflect as it were in a mirror-
like fashion social conflict-structures ; thus different interest-
groups had and have (frequently also formally) different chances of
participation in the legislative process, and cleavages can be covered
up by overlappings and alliances in the observed party- or factional
structures . However we think that we can start from the fact that
parliaments are those central decision-makers and parliamentary lea-
dership-groups are that segment of national elites in whose make-up
and action, structures of conflict and lines of tension manifest them-
selves most evidently. (28) One piece of evidence for this is the
shape of the parliamentary landscape of the German Empire, in which
socio-economic, religious, sectional and ethnic conflicts have found
a very immediate expression in the factional structures and voting-
patterns . (29) But it is to be presumed - and to be proved by a great
number of findings - that the extension of cleavages into the parlia-
ments was and is less pregnant in other systems and at other points
in time. Thus Great Britain in the 19th century can count as an example of
the relative autonomy of parliamentary leadership-groups vis-à-vis
the social system . In the. context discussed here, analytically inter-
esting is only that share of autonomy which is not to be traced back
to formal restrictions on voting-rights . (30) The investigation of
the extent, causes and effects of this indeterminacy (Lasswell:
"representativeness" (31)) shall be o n e subject of the plan pro-
posed here.
German parliamentary history opens up a good approach to the posing
of such problems . This history is characterized by fundamental
changes of the political system in which the distribution of
political power and the access to political power were newly organized formal-
ly. Naturally, the effects of the sudden change of constitutional
orders on the structure and behavior of parliamentary leadership-
groups can be better investigated in a country whose history is
moulded by such discontinuities than in states with uninterrupted
political traditions like the USA or Great Britain . This state of
+By a "factional structure" we understand here the arrangement of
a parliament into such associations of representatives which claim
to determine the voting-behavior of their members over time and
various political areas .
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affairs justifies, for Germany, also a special interest in a long-
term analysis comprehending several "regimes".
The expectation of a relatively undisturbed extension of cleavages
into the forum of decision in the case of parliaments in contrast
to other central decision-makers was an important reason for choosing
parliamentary leadership-groups as an object of research . Thereby one
must, however, remain aware that - as Pierre Birnbaum has investiga
ted in thé case of France - parlamentarians are related to other seg
ments of the national elite in varying constellations of "fusion' and
"dissociation" . (32) Thus, the be vi,ôr, mentality and structure of
parliamentary leadership-groups are to be interpreted as elements of
a comprehensive system of the elite, but without the demand for a
total analysis of "the" national elite necessarily having to be de-
duced from this . Parliaments are an autonomous part-sector of the
elite-system - whereby the degree of autonomy can vary from case to
case - whose personnel acts and is recruited according to laws par-
tially its own . Roughly, the peculiarity of parliamentary leader-
ship-groups can be characterized by the fact that 1) they are an in-
tersection of different segments of the elite-system, a mixtum corn-
positum of representatives of different interest-groups, and that
2) the area of decisions in which they are involved is extraordina-
rily widely taken and heterogeneous . Both of these facts lead to
the result that, in all modern societies, parliaments and parliamen-
tarians play a significant role among those whom Kadushin calls the
"Central Power Circle" : "At the very least, legislatures serve as
check-points or as mobilizers of elite opinions ; at most they are
key influentials in the decision-making process itself and must be
consulted" . (33) Therefore, the constellations of cooperation and
conflict with other segments of the national elite will be treated
as significant aspects of a conception of . investigation centered on
parliamentary leadership-groups . It is regrettable, although in the
framework of a historically comparative investigation unavoidable,
that thereby relations between sectors of the elite-system can be
grasped only on the level of formal structures and as overlapping
memberships (in the sense of a positional approach).
However, this qualification does not hold for the internal structure
of the parliaments . In this area it is possible, through the documen-
tation of voting-behavior, to identify informal networks also in the
historical dimension . What Kadushin names as the reason for a special
interest on the part of the network-analysts in parliamentary leader-
ship-groups and decision-processes, holds good precisely for histori-
cal parliaments : "Their committees, parties and rules of procedure
are their formal structures, but these generally do not determine
the actual alignments of interaction or structure of influence . Network
studies of legislators are  therefore expecially interesting and it
is somewhat amusing to find them the structural equivalent of a
neighborhood gang" . (34) The methods of and problems posed by an
application of legislative vote-call call analysis will be more
closely examined further below.
The central hypothesis of our project rests upon Stein Rokkan's ob-
servation that the national integration of Germany was burdened by
an accumulation of "developmental crises" which other countries were
able to overcome sequentially in the process of their formation as
nations and states ; a fact which is traditionally discussed by
German research, with a somewhat altered perspective, under the key-
word "die verspätete Nation" ("the delayed nation") . (35)
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The process of the "founding of the Empire" was rendered extraordi-
narily difficult through the fact that in a few decades all those
central problems had to be solved which are connected with the pro-
cess of national integration:
-
the unification of the system of justice, the taxation system and
the military ; the creation of a surface transport- and
communication-system (penetration);
- the joining of oppositional ethnic and religious minority-groups;
the unification of regions which were differently depending on
the world-market (integration);
- the extension of the right to vote to groups which up until then
possessed no rights of participation (participation);
- the development of a canon of national symbols and myths and its
communication by means of the media and institutions of political
socialization (identity);
-
the creation of loyalty towards, trust in and observance of the
national political institutions (legitimacy);
- and, finally, the establishment of institutions of social security
and of a taxation-system which did away with traditional privi-
leges and levelled regional disparities (redistribution).
The founders of the Empire had to solve this bundle of problems for
a society and a political culture which were characterized by a plu-
rality of social and regional, religious, ethnic and ideological
cleavages . (36) Following Arthur Stinchcombe we understand these
"cleavages" as coalitions between party-elites and interest-groups.
(37) The presupposition for the extension of the cleavages into the
parliamentary forum was that a regional component was laid under
the central lines of tension : The insular industrialization and the
regionally different orientations to the international markets led
to the result that socio-economic distribution-conflicts were simul-
taneously settled as regional-conflicts
. Just so, the historical dis-
tribution of confessional camps was conducive to the reinforcement
of territorially particular orientations ; the same holds for
the different expression of political cultures in the German states with
their specifically deviating constitutional traditions ; the same
holds also for the problem of the integration of ethnic minorities
which were for the most part concentrated in closed areas of
settlement. This constellation made also the representatives of those (in-
terest-)political camps which throughout the Empire were in a clear
minority-position capable to gain a majority in certain regions . The
other side of the coin was that until 1918 no German party succeeded
in extending itself fully throughout the Empire and the party-land-
scape remained characterized by clear regional patterns
. (38)
Now it is further argued that the accumulation of developmental
crises under the condition of a segmented political culture
factionalized and polarized the parliamentary landscape of Germany in such
a manner that, up until the end of the Weimar Republic, the capabi-
lity of the national parliaments to form coalitions, to make compro-
mises, to coordinate itself and . finally, thereby to gain power was re-
tarded . Simultaneously, with this the , presuppositions for the wide-
spread acceptance . of an authoritarian guidance of German politics
by the executive were given . (39)
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Here, more widely reaching perspectives of investigation become
recognizable : For example, the question concerning the kind and
weight of the determinants which influenced the formation of the
parliamentary landscape in Germany (how great was, e .g ., the rela-
tive weight of socio-economic, religious, and regional orienta-
tions?), or concerning a comparison with other countries (is the
strength, at first increasing and after the Second World War then
decreasing, of the connection between social and factional structure
a specific feature of the parliamentary development of Germany, or
can similar changes be proved in the parliaments of other countries?)
and concerning the significance of such connections for parliamentary
decision-making processes (how does a crystallization of factions
along socio-economic/regional/religious lines of tension effect their
compromise- and coalition-capability? Is it only accidental that the
three coalitions of German history which encompassed wings
. - the "Si-
mon-Gagern-Pact" of 1849, the Weimar Coalition and the Great Coali-
tion - arose in periods in which socio-economic lines of tension had
a relatively slight effect on the inner-structure of the parliaments?).
With these questions, considerations get taken up which the contem-
porary observer Otto Hintze has already formulated in his article
on "Das monarchische Prinzip und die konstitutionelle Verfassung".
(40) In it he ascertains that the parliaments in Germany have not
succeeded in gaining the "ruling influence in the state", among other
things because they
"were demplecely lacking in the necessary inner unity and
solidity which would, under all conditions, be the pre-con-
dition for a role in political power . The great economic
and social gap which has always existed between the Prus-
sian East and West and which has its roots in the diversity
of the agrarian structure
	
and of the different division
of the agrarian and industrial interests prevents a unified
integration just as does the opposition of religious confes-
sions, which maintains itself in no other state in the world
so strongly and comprehensively as in Prussia and in the
German Empire. In addition to this there comes especially the
radical animosity of Social Democracy vis-a-vis the state in
the Empire
. . . . With us parties are, properly speaking, not
political but rather economic-social or religious-confessional
formations
. This is connected with the fact that it is actual-
ly the life of the bourgeois society - as opposed to the actu-
al political operation - which finds expression in our repre-
sentative-bodies . . . . That is, however, a formation of the
party-system which leads more to a monarchical leadership of
the state than to parliamentary influence ." (41)
In a similar way, though more from the viewpoint of the active po-
litician, Friedrich Naumann has characterized the connection between
the character of the social system and the kind of power-organiza-
tion in Germany:
"So long as the majority-formation remains on the present
German level of development, the initiative of the
Reichstag can only be slight. In this respect the constitution
offers more than what the Reichstag up until today can
offer . So long as the parties mutually neutralize one an-
other, the right of the Reichstag, for its part, to suggest
laws is almost a slumbering right : Our law-making gets done,
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in reality, by the government, and the Reichstag has only
the possibility of introducing changes and accepting or
rejecting them . . . . It is pointless to declaim about the
rape of the Reichstag, so long as it is not capable, of
itself, of offering a firm foundation in the case of
greater legislative actions
." (42)
This argumentation also renders plausible the relatively well-ordered
functioning of the parliamentary system of the Federal Republic,
which certainly is not only to be traced back to the wisdom of our
founding fathers:
- The reduction of the significance of religious cleavages through
the decreasing strength of religious connections and through the
the removal of Catholicism from its minority-position as a conse-
quence of the drawing of the borders after 1945;
- the . levelling of sectional contrasts by the removal of developmen-
tal backwardness, the loss of the agrarian north-east, the mixing
together of the population as a consequence of the movements of
flight and wandering after 1945 and the dissolution of the
historical German states;
- the cession of almost all areas with ethnic minority-groups ; and,
finally,
- the decreasing militancy of socio-economic conflicts as a conse-
quence of the economic prosperity during the early phase of the
Federal Republic, by means of the establishment of functionable
institutions and procedures for the mediation of interests and
the policy of collection of the larger parties
have dissolved traditional political "camps", or have at least
rendered their fronts more permeable and, therewith, have strength-
ened the capability of the Bundestag to form coalitions and to coor-
dinate itself. (43) With that, this development would be the fruit
of the fact, occasionally regretted, that after 1945 the German par-
ties have become "sociologically, and, in terms of world-view, root-
less" and "today form a kind of super-structure which, socially, does
not reach very deeply ." (44)
We justify the decision to restrict the time period of the inquiry
chiefly to the years from 1848, in which the first national parlia-
ment of Germany met, to 1953 with the clearly deviating contextual
conditions of the parliamentary system of the Federal Republic : This
is the phase of factional polarisation and relative instability of
the parliamentary landscape of Germany . This limitation of the period
covered may also be drawn from the findings of electoral history:
While the election of the Bundestag of 1949 "still exposes the struc-
tures of . the elections of the Weimar Republic", by the election of
1953 "the party-structure of the Federal Republic was newly ordered,
the election has been, in V . O . Key's sense of the term, a 'critical
election' ." (45)
In connection with the considerations of the preceding section, our
theoretical assumptions can be systematized in the following way
(46) :
	
'
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Table 2 : Central categories of investigation and causal connections
of an analysis of parliamentary leadership-groups.
Cleavage . Structure
Systemic Policy Outcomes 	 Elite Characteristics
Legislative Behavior
We distinguish four central categories of investigation:
1. the cleavage-structure, as an enduring pattern of political con-
flict, which is anchored in the social-structure and has found
its expression in the system of parties;
2. characteristics of the origins and careers of parliamentary lea-
dership-groups (elite-characteristics), in which experiences of
socialization, chances of access to parliamentary leadership-
groups, continuity of the exercising of legislative functions
and the association with other segments of the elite-system mani-
fest themselves on the individual level;
3. legislative behavior as an expression of issue-orientations and
group-connections of the members of parliamentary leadership-
groups ; and
4. "systemic policy outcomes", by which we mean - borrowing from Carl
Beck et al . (47) - central decisions at the level of the state as
a whole in which, besides parliamentary leadership-groups, other
segments of the elite-system too are involved and which,
in particular, concern the regulation of the access to power and the
range of the exercising of power by leadership-groups.
Between the central categories of investigation, the following cau-
sal connections are being postulated:
1. an influence of the cleavage-structure on the recruitment of par-
liamentary leadership-groups in such a manner that the "social-
moral milieus" sent representatives each with specific con-
stellations of attributes, further, an influence of the properties
of the electorate on the behavior of the actors in the legislative
process in such a manner that the perception of interests and ex-
pectations of the voters effected through the anticipation of their
voting-behavior the decisions of the elected ; (48)
2. an influence of characteristics of social background and career
of the members of parliamentary leadership-groups on their legis-
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lative behavior through acquired values and issue-orientations;
these can have been mediated via socialization and/or connections
of interest;
3. an effect of legislative behavior on the "systemic policy out-
comes" in such a manner that the capability of parliamentary lea-
dership-groups to form coalitions and to arrive at (internal) com-
promises influences their chance to acquire and expand positions
of power in competition with other segments of the elite-system
( 49 );
4. a repercussion of the "systemic policy outcomes" on the legisla-
tive behavior, in particular by establishingthe responsibilities
of the parliaments ; further an effect of the "systemic policy out-
comes" on the recruitment of parliamentary leadership-groups,
partly immediately by restrictions . of the voting-right, partly
mediately by financial compensation and such ; and finally an ef-
fect on the cleavage-structure, e . g ., over the granting or denial
of possibilities of articulation for oppositional "milieus", or
ethnic and religious minority-groups.
In our model, two criss-crossing dimensions of investigation are
being connected : for one thing, we can distinguish categories of
investigation which characterize the socio-political context for
the action and the recruitment of parliamentary leadership-groups
(Cleavage-structure, systemic policy outcomes) from those which
cover these leadership-groups themselves on the individual level (elite
-characteristics, legislative behavior) . For another thing, the cate-
gories of investigation can be classified according to whether they
belong more to the political area (legislative behavior, systemic
policy outcomes) or are more related to the social-system (cleavage-
structure, elite-characteristics)
. Therewith our approach can be
characterized simultaneously as multi-levelled in the sense of a con-
nection between contextual and individual data and as transcending
areas in the sense of an interlocking of social and political analysis.
Our model of a plexus of relations between the social system, the
political system and the elite-system can claim no theoretical con-
ciseness . Exogenous factors which cannot be controlled, or only in-
sufficiently, react upon the categories of investigation . E . g .,
this holds for the aspect of a federal structure of the political
system, which we take into account only insofar as it becomes manifest
on the level of national leadership-groups . However, in spite of
this restriction, we assume that our conception of investigation
covers a constellation of variables which is of some explanatory power
for our task of analyzing the (social-) structural conditions for
the delayed and crisis-infected development of German parliamentaria-
nism . In this way, we want to get into the developmental problems of
German parliamentarianism with less moral prejudice and ideological
predisposition and with more appropriate methods than has been fre-
quently done until now. Thus we do not consider "failure" and "trea-
son" of bourgeois politicians to be useful categories of a histori-
cal-political sociology, and the phenomena intended thereby are not
"ultimate" reasons, but rather themselves in need of explanation . (50)
At the same time, the investigation into German parliamentarianism
should be freed from its previous orientation to the history of per-
sons and events and taken up under a social-scientific perspective
as the analysis of the structural conditions of parliamentary
processes of recruitment and decision .
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3 . METHODS
Our project will investigate the recruitment, careers and political
behavior of the members of national German parliaments between 1848
and 1953
. Excluding the phases between 1849 and 1867 (North German
Reichstag) as well as between 1945 and 1949, in which there were no
national, or at least supra-regional parliaments in Germany, fur-
ther, the time of the National Socialistic dictatorship, in which
no competitive selection of parliamentary leadership-groups took
place and the Reichstag was degraded to a rubber-stamp, the period
under investigation extends itself over 73 years . In this period, a
total of ca
. 5,250 representatives belonged to German parliaments.
This large number makes the application of sampling-procedures ad-
visable . However, random-sampling is inapplicable because of the pro-
nounced factionalization of German parliaments in the period under
investigation . In relation to individual legislative periods the num-
ber of cases would decrease so far that deeply reaching multivariate
analyses would no longer be possible . Because of the sloping distri-
bution of many
	
attributes, similar problems would also arise in
the case of a stratified probability-sample or of a quota-sample . Thus
in the area of biographical and career characteristics many categories
are only weakly filled . To provide their representation in the sample,
an increased quota would have to be apportioned to them . But this
would lead to an extremely complicated stratification of the sample
and increase considerably the danger of errors in the analysis.
But above all it is problematical that the communication-connections
of legislative behavior which are documented in the voting-patters
would be destroyed by sampling-procedures based on probability or
quotas . As a result, questions about the formal and informal organi-
sation of legislative decision-making could no longer be answered.
The complete reconstruction of individual ad hoc-coalitions and pro-
to-factions would be extraordinarily laborious and liable to error.
In addition to this it would provide only a fragmentary picture of
the phenomenon being investigated, because an important reservation
against an application of representative sampling-procedures in the
case of roll-call analysis holds true : "A simple, true-to-scale
sample taken from a comprehensive totality abstracts . . . from impor-
tant structural features of the collective . In particular, in this
way important networks of institutions of opinion-formation like
neighborhoods and cliques are usually torn asunder ." (51)
Since, for the reasons mentioned, the number of cases cannot be re-
duced by means of the application of sampling-techniques, it is ne-
cessary, from the viewpoint of research-economy, to restrict the
list of variables to some central categories of investigation . There-
by it will be proposed, for the analysis of the voting-behavior, to
take a random-sample from the aggregate of all roll-call votes . The
techniques and the methodological problems of drawing samples out of
a pool of variables will be examined more closely in another context.
The research-plan submitted here combines the methods of collective
biography, quantitative voting-analysis and multi-level analysis
(in the sense of an application of context-variables on the voting-
district level) . With this combination of methods we intend first of
all to reconstruct the recruitment and legislative behavior of par-
liamentary leadership-groups in an empirical density and temporal
depth which have not yet been available up until now for the case of
Germany. In a further step, the findings are to be drawn into a more
comprehensive conception of investigation which, simplifying, can be
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formulated in the following research-question : Which structural pro-
perties of the surrounding society and political culture (context-
variables) have determined the capability of parliamentary leader-
ship-groups (collective and individual elite-characteristics) to make
compromises, to form coalitions and therewith also their chance to
gain power in such a way which, in turn,' contributed to the delayed
and crisis-infected development of German parliamentarianism (syste-
matic policy outcomes : the dependent variable)? This research-per-
spective is approximately reflected in the variable-plan of the pro-
ject . It can be divided, roughly, into three sections:
1) Origine and careers of the representatives;
2) Parliamentary voting-behavior;
	
3) Voting-district data.
3 .1) Origine and careers
Features such as year of birth, type and location of the place of
origin, family-background (father's profession) and formal education
(school and university grades) are taken as social background variab-
les . In this connection, above all questions are to be posed about
the significance of the starting-chances and the early experiences
of socialization in the family and educational system for the
recruitment, behavior and mentality of parliamentary leadership-groups . For
example, was there a connection between homogeneity of origin, cohe-
sion and capability of political cooperation? Some evidence for this hypo-
thesis is provided by a comparison of social-background characteristics
between British MP's and German MDR's : While the members of traditional
elites in the British House of Commons enjoyed a clear majority and
almost 40 % of the MP's had received their university education at
Oxford and Cambridge, the Reichstage - in terms of family and educa-
tional background - were far more heterogeneous . (52)
A further aspect of the investigation are the "cohort-effects" which
are possibly realized in the age-distribution : For example, have
collective "key-experiences" such as the Revolution of 1848, the found-
ing of the Empire in 1871, the First World War and the National So-
cialist seizure of power had significant effects on the orientations
and behavior of parliamentary leadership-groups? (53)
On the other hand, religion and factional membership indicate rather
stable value-orientations, which at the same time refer to connections
to certain "social-moral milieus" and define the relationships bet-
ween representatives and their social, political and cultural
surroundings
. (54) It is presumed that value-orientations also get ex-
pressed in voting-behavior, whereby here - depending upon the con-
text - individual components of the value-orientation can come into
conflict with one another and differentiated processes of evaluation
can become effective . The problems of the indicator-quality of voting
-data which result from this will be discussed in the following sec-
tion.
Career-characteristics of the representatives are covered by informa-
tion on the membership in national and regional parliaments, further,
by data on their professional background . In this connection, an
important question is the relationship, already discussed, between the
professional composition of the parliaments and their factional struc-
ture . A further aspect is the investigation of tendencies towards pro-
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fessionalization and continuity of the exercise of parliamentary
functions . For example, when, in which formations and under which
circumstances did stable parliamentary leadership-groups in Germany
(in contrast to other countries) appear on the national level? How
large was the "net circulation" (personal circulation (55)), ex-
pressed as the rate of exchange of the membership in parliament from
legislative period to legislative period? How large was the average
length of stay in parliament? Is it as a matter of fact so, as some
researchers think, that a low net circulation goes hand in hand with
a growing isolation of leadership-groups and a decreasing readiness
for innovation (56), or, vice versa, does the formation of relative-
ly stable and professionalized leadership-groups increase their elas-
ticity for adaption, as Max Weber apparently assumed? (57) How large
was the "gross circulation" (social circulation), expressed as the
rate of change of central social background-variables of the members
of an elite-system? (58) How did the connection between change on
the level of the whole society and the recruitment-patterns of par-
liamentary leadership-groups take shape? For example, how is the
phenomenon to be assessed that the very high percentages of
government officials in the early German parliaments (Frankfurt and Prussian
National Assembly, Second Chambers in Bavaria, Württemberg, Baden and
Hessen at the middle of the 19th century : over 50 % (59)) clearly de-
creased in the Empire (Reichstag 1903 : 18 % (60)), in order to rise
again drastically in the Weimar Republic (Reichstag 1924 I . : 25 %
(61)) and the Federal Republic (8th Bundestag 43 % (62))? Were there
comparable occurrences in other countries (the France of Louis
Philippe - to characterize the starting-situation : 32-45 % (63))? A
further question to be investigated in this connection concerns the
relative significance and the change of significance of local, re-
gional and national instances of recruitment . Was there - as is re-
peatly maintained - a process of the "nationalization" of parliamen-
tary leadership-groups? To what extent and in what way did altera-
tions of the voting-rights play a roll thereby?
The data on the origins and careers of German parliamentarians are
to be gathered primarily from parliamentary handbooks, the collec-
tions of biographies published by parties, party-correspondences and
other contemporary periodicals
. A collection of such materials can
be found in the Archive of the Bundestag . It is helpful that, in the
Biographisches Handbuch der Reichstage compiled by Max Schwarz, some
biographical core-data of all German representatives of national par-
liaments for the entire period of time under investigation (with the
exception of the first Bundestage) are available in a form already pre-
structured . (64) Schwarz covers the characteristics voting-district,
year of birth, profession, academic and nobel title, length of mem -
bership in the Reichstag and regional parliaments
. But unfortunately
his collection is unreliable in many cases and contains gaps, in par-
ticular for the early German parliaments
. For this reason, and be-
cause additional biographical information shall be considered inqui-
ries of our own on the basis of primary material remain necessary.
This has already taken place for the representatives of the Frank-
furt National Assembly on the basis of the "Biographische Ausarbeitun-
gen" put out by archivists of the Frankfurt Außenstelle of the Bundes-
archiv . The data are presently being transformed into machine-readable
form. The set of variables for this partial study is much more exten-
sive than the one for the whole project . In addition it includes,
among other information, changes of residence, stages of the course of
study, changes of professional position, association-affiliations,
functions in clubs, membership in committees, political functions at
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the local and district level, participation in protest-actions and
political persecutions . The collection of primary material by the
Archiv was extraordinarily laborious and extended over decades . Thus,
covering the whole German Confederation within the boundaries of 1848 to 1851,
the church-records of the birth- and death-places of the
representative,;, matriculations at the university, police-records, privately
and publicly available testaments, government handbooks, contemporary
newspaper-articles as well as an almost immense biographical, regional
and local historical literature were made use of
. This extent of in-
quiry would burst asunder the framework of a temporally restricted
plan of research, if it were to be extended to the whole period of
time under investigation
. In addition to this, because of the destruc-
tion or inaccessibility of archives as a result of the Second World
War, much biographical data is no longer to be reconstructed for the
whole German Confederation . These considerations justify the decision, in
our project, to restrict the inquiry rigidly to such characteristics
which are particularly relevant and accessible in printed sources.
Besides problems of the availability of data, specific defects in the
quality of biographical evidence are to be noted . The methodological
difficulties which arise here are discussed under the key-word "func-
tionality of biographical information" (65)
. What is meant is that
the representatives expected from the publication of their personal
data an influence on their career-chances which, in the case of
greater discrepancies between "intended" and factual biography, could
become the motive for the manipulation and interpolation of curricula
vitae . Members of workers parties were especially liable, and in-
formation concerning profession was particularly frequently involved.
The comparison of different sources as the usual way of purifying
biographical data from such falsifications and distortions is la-
borous and time consuming
. Therefore it is very helpful that, for
the particularly large and particularly involved population of the
SPD-representatives, the project can fall back upon the "cleaned-up"
data of the Berlin researcher Wilhelm H . Schröder . The same holds
true for the collection of biographical data, above all of represen-
tatives of the Zentrum, which was compiled by Klemens Arndt at the
Historisches Seminar der Universität zu Köln.
3 .2) Voting-behavior
A presupposition for an application of quantitative voting-analysis
are formal internal sturctures of the parliaments which are loose or
strongly varying in the course of time
. If the behavior of the re-
presentatives in parliamentary decisions is not determined by factio-
nal discipline and/or constant connection to a coalition, then by
means of a serial analysis of voting-patterns latent determinants of
legislative behavior, such as interest-connections, ideological fixa-
tions and tactical calculations, become apparent
. (66) Among other
informal networks of relationships we distingish "proto-factions"
(i . e ., groups of representatives of different factions who vote in
the same way on specific issues) and ad-hoc-coalitions (i . e ., corres-
pondance in the voting-behavior of factions which are restricted
temporally or to specific issues without a formal agreement)
. Using
the methodology of roll-call analysis it becomes possible, on better empi-
rical foundations than previously, to answer questions about the course
and determinants of singular parliamentary decisions
. For example,
how did the pressure of competing loyalties effect the voting-beha-
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vior of representatives of the Zentrum from agriculturally and in-
dustrially structured voting-districts when a question like the rais-
ing of the duties on grain was at stake? How did which representa-
tives of the national-liberal faction vote in issues in which funda-
mental liberal principles collided with considerations of political
opportunism, thus in the case of the socialist laws? Was there a
persuasive, obstructive cooperation between the NSDAP and the KPD fac-
tions against the Weimar Republic, independently of the voting-ob-
jects up for debate? (67) Over and above the reconstruction and de-
scription of such concrete decision and strategies for action, quan-
titative voting-analysis is capable of revealing fundamental condi-
tions and structures of legislative behavior which transcend time,
groups and subjects . (68) Then the findings which have been gained
on the level of parliamentary representative bodies can be drawn into
more comprehensive analyses of the political process . Among others,
W . O
. Aydelotte has pointed to the research possibilities of roll-
call analysis, in particular for historical social research : " The
analysis of parliamentary history raises questions not only about the
maneuvers and strategies of political leaders but also about the con-
ditions out of which these actions emerged or with which they were
designed to cope . A legislature that deals with major questions re-
flects the society behind it, public tensions and disagreements, in
the sense that general social and political problems are dealt with
and settled, whether adequately or not . It is sometimes argued that
the study of representative assemblies, in view of the kind of work
they did and in view of the great amount of information we have about
them, constitutes one of our principal windows upon the (socio-) po-
litical history of the past, an effective means of learning how
politics actually worked." (69)
Thereby the restriction indeed holds that in parliamentary votes only
a part of legislative behavior becomes manifest . Important decisions
also get made in committees, factional committees and negotiations
between the proponents of parliamentary groupings . These aspects are,
for the past, only inadequately documented, at least when one keeps
in mind the requirements of a consistent basis of data
. Thus the
scope of analyses of the voting-behavior is restricted insofar as
they immediately document only the last act of the parliamentary de-
cision-making process
. On this basis, statements about that which
happened in the forefield are indeed not impossible, but they pre-
suppose the employment of complex procedures of analysis and the
readiness to make long chains of inferences . (70)
Now before the cognitive potential of quantitative voting-analyses
for the present project gets more exactly defined, it remains to ex-
plain whether and to what extent the structural presuppositions, al-
ready indicated, for the employment of this methodological instrument
are given at all in German parliamentary history
. First inquiries of
our own and the evaluation of the - indeed scanty - literature on the
subject allow an optimistic prognosis . While, on the level of voting-
behavior, the Bundestag is .(or better: has become) a very disciplined
parliament and therefore is of little interest for the analyst of
votes (the only "latent" dimension here is the factor of factional,
respectively, coalitional discipline), this does not hold true for
historical German parliaments up to and inclusive of the Reichstage
of the Weimar Republic.
In principle four types of irregularities of legislative behavior can
be distinguished, in which informal structures manifest themselves
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and in the case of which an application of roll-call-analysis is
meanful:
a) Dissident voting-behavior, thus a breach of factional discipline,
or - in less rigid contexts - deviation from the factional majo-
rity . This is the "classic" case of the deviation and was, in the
German parliaments until the beginning of the 20th century, an
everyday affair . For 52 votes in the Frankfurt National Assembly
we have ascertained an average of approximately 20 % dissidents
per vote, which varied from faction to faction (thereby the Left
tends to be more disciplined than the Right) . In the Reichstag of
the Empire the average was, according to a first, rough estimate,
at ca . 10 % (with peaks on certain votes which split heterogeneous
factions, thus e . g . the votes on commercial policy of the 9th
legistative period) . In the Reichstag of the Weimar Republic the
average was at ca . 7 % (71) ; a decrease which can be explained
by the better possibilities for sanctions of the party and
factional heads as a consequence of the proportional voting-right.
b) Non-factional representatives
. Their share in the Frankfurter
National Assembly was at ca
. 27 % of all representatives . They
formed, next to the members of the Right-Center, the strongest
grouping in the Paulskirche
. (72) In the Reichstag of the Empire
the "Wilden" and "Hospitanten" had a share of 16-10 % (with a
decreasing tendency), while this type of representative, because
of the voting-right which was prohibitive of individual candidacy,
was no longer present in the Weimar Republic . (73)
c) Change of faction . Up until now quantitative data on this type of
"irregularity" could be gathered only for the Weimar Republic.
Here the values vary between 17 % of all representatives (in the
voting-period 1920 to 1924) and 6 % (in the voting-period 1930 to
1932) . (74) As a general feature changes of faction also belonged
to the usual occurrences of German parliamentarianism : Frequently
whole wings split off from the mother-faction, which then either
lay as "erratic blocks" on the parliamentary landscape or joined
themselves to other factions.
d) Change of coalition and ad-hoc-coalitions. In the Empire, with the
exception of a few years, no constant majorities or even clearly
delimitable government - respectively opposition-camps formed
themselves
. Votes were worked out mostly ad hoc between the fac-
tions, respectively, between the factions and the government . Some-
thing similar holds true for the Weimar Reichstag, which here took
over the inheritance of its predecessor and whose incapacity to
form a constant majority is notorious . (75) In contrast to the
Reichstag of the Empire, in the Weimar Republic it was indeed the
government which was in danger of falling in the case of a re-
grouping of the parliamentary landscape
. The changing voting-con-
stellations render it meaningful to apply the repertoire of quan-
titative voting-analysis also to the Weimar Reichstage, which,
with respect to dissident voting-behavior, exhibit somewhat more
stabile parliamentary structures.
In view of the ephemeral formal structures and fluctuating coalition-
connections of the German parliaments before the war, in the appli-
cation of procedures of voting-analysis we see a chance to widen the
positional approach of elite analysis to include procedures of net-
work-analysis
.
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Under this aspect, the following concrete research-questions are to
be treated:
Which factors and cleavages structured the voting-behavior which,
especially in early German parliamentarianism, often appears dif-
fuse? How did such patterns change in the course of time? How did
which representatives vote under the pressure of competing loyal-
ties? In which manner and with what "closeness" did social cleavages
continue on into the area of the parliaments? How did such connections
between social-system and power-organization effect the chances of
party-, respectively, faction-leaderships and executives to influence
parliamentary decision-making processes? On the other hand, what ef-
fect did such connections have on the capability of parliamentary
leadership-groups to coordinate themselves, to form coalitions and
to make compromises?
For quite a long time problems of this kind have been investigated
by international research on the basis of voting-behavior . (76) There-
by, a very positive - occasionally even euphoric - estimate of the vali-
dity, reliability and scope of this type of data is dominant . (77)
But it should render rather skeptical that here a plurality of dif-
ferent research problems is being approached on the basis of series
of similar indicators . This indicates that voting-behavior is a multi-
dimensional phenomenon in which different calculations and
predispositions flow together in specifically different constellations . It
is not accidental that the instrument of
	
Guttman-Scaling, which
presupposes one-dimensionality of the indicators used, is becoming
unfashionable in roll-call analysis . The investigations of the in-
dicator-quality of voting-data, still rare, have indicated the pro-
perty of multi-dimensionality and attempted to show ways in which
the different factors which cooperate in legislative voting can be
isolated
. (78) Today it is agreed that votes, as indirect indicators
and resultants of different factors of influence, do not represent -
respectively do not only represent - individual attitudes and ideolo-
gical predispositions of the individual representative (which, in
turn, can be the result of experiences of socialization, of the sub-
sequent rationalization of past manners of behavior - of his "voting
history" - etc .) . Rather, the representative orientates himself (si-
multaneously) on the expectations of relevant actors in his surround-
ings (field of forces) such as faction- and party-leadership, execu-
tives, groupings and formations within factions, respectively, par-
ties, extra-parliamentary interest-groups and the electorate
. (79)
John Kingdon has interpreted the operation of these actors on the
voting-behavior as a process in the sense of a sequence of calcula-
tions of the representative
. His integrated model of parliamentary
voting-behavior exposes the multi-dimensionality of this indicator
(80) :
Illustration 3 overleaf
This model opens up also a theoretical access to the question about
the causes of the varying structuredness of parliamentary voting-
behavior . It can be formulated as a hypothesis : The more inconsistent
the expectations of the actors are and the more their particular
chances for sanctions resemble each other, the more incoherent will
be the voting-behavior and the greater is the latitude for indivi-
dual decisions of the representatives .
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At this point the question about the possibilities of isolating and
weighing the different components of voting-behavior poses itself.
Only after such a step can the validity of this type of indicator be
determined with an exactness which suffices for a systematic test of
hypotheses . A presupposition is that the different factors which co-
operate in voting-behavior manifest themselves as patterms of simi-
larities and differences between groups of issues . Empirical findings
show that this condition is, as a rule, fulfilled for parliaments
with loose factional-ties . Then the analysis of the correlations bet-
ween voting-results can be used as an effective instrument for the
discovery of the dimensionality of legislative behavior . (81) Thus,
e . g ., the results of a factor-analysis of votes in the Frankfurt
National Assembly can be interpreted plausibly in the framework of
an actor-model such as it is being proposed by Kingdon . Investiga-
tions related to the present, in which voting-analyses were confron-
ted with results of interviews, have demonstrated a fairly good cor-
respondence between ex-post-interpretations of voting-patterns by
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scientists and the self-observation of legislative behavior by the
representatives . (82) Thus the expectation appears to be justified
that such procedures of analysis, which are capable of representing
the multi-dimensionality of the phenomenon, make possible an appro-
priate evaluation of the indicator-quality of voting-data . Among
these procedures are in particular multi-dimensional scaling, factor-
and cluster-analyses
. It remains to be added ; that their application
is not only a promising approach to the solution of the problem of
validity, but also let us expect significant empirical results.
Besides the evaluation of the indicator-quality, the
ascertainment of criteria for the selection of votes is a further basic me-
thodological problem with the analysis of legislative behavior . This
holds especially true for a long-term investigation such as the
project presented here, in which a total inquiry, simply from the view-
point of the economy of research, is inapplicable . During the Frank-
furt National Assembly, lasting ca . one year, alone there were appro-
ximately 300 roll-call votes ; in the Reichstag of the Weimar Republic
between 1923 and 1933 there were ca . 500 . The total number of roll-
call votes in the period of time under investigation can be roughly
estimated at ca . 4,900 . With a number of, , on the average, ca . 450
seats in parliament, for the variable-group of the voting-behavior
alone a data-matrix with 2 .2 million places would have to be worked
out . With respect to the volume of information gathered as well as
the expense of the analysis, such masses of data would burst the
framework of a research of limited length and restricted resources.
Therefore it is necessary to make a selection from the documented
"universe of indicators" which secures, as undisturbed as possible,
the most important properties of the phenomenon which is to be
measured . In social research the question concerning a representa-
tive selection of indicators has been discussed, controversially,
for quite a long time . Thereby, weighty arguments have been stated
against a position which regards selecting indicators as analogous
to sampling units of observation . (83) It is supposed that, since a
universe of indicators which is only theoretically determined repre-
sents no basic totality in the statistical sense, a central presup-
position for the applicability of a calculation of selection based
on theoretical probability remains unfulfilled . This reservation,
however, does not extend into the given research-situation : the roll-
call votes documented for the period of time under investigation form.
a well-demarcated universe whose elements possess a calculable pro-
bability of getting into the sample . Thus, here we have the case, in
social research rather rare, of a large but closed set of similar
indicators . In legislative roll-call analysis, the transposition of
the data-matrix, here usual, also speaks in favor of the admissibi-
lity of a selection of indicators analogous to the selection of cases:
cases (representatives) are then treated as variables and variables
(votes) as cases . (84)
The procedures for the selection of votes can be demarcated roughly
according to the necessary degree of the preparation of the primary
material . Thus the application of Guttmann-Scaling (selection of
votes according to the one-dimensionality of the issues treated) and
factor-analysis (selection of votes according to the strength of the
"loads" on latent
. properties of the characteristic-space) presupposes
a complete availability of individual votes in machine-readable form.
(85) Thus procedures of selection of this type can be used for a re-
duction of data in the phases of analysis and interpretation, but
they are not capable of narrowing down the extent of data-gathering .
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Therefore they are to be applied meaningfully only in such research
-contexts in which voting-data in machine-readable form are already
available covering time and space . Up until now this is only the
case for the USA, but not for Germany.
The second type of selection-procedure rests upon an inspectation of
the marginal distributions of voting-results . Thereby votes are se-
lected according to their "importance", which is measured 1) as the
proportion of representatives who take part in a vote to the total
number of representatives and 2) as the extent of the disputedness
of the decision, expressed as the proportion of "yes"- and "no"-
votes . The American political scientist Riker has combined these
components into a "coefficient of significance" . (86) With this pro-
cedure a narrowing down of the extent of the inquiry can indeed be
reached, for in the protocols of the negotiations of the parliaments
the results of roll-call votes are also documented in an aggregated
form . However, the underlying concept of the "importance" of votes
is highly problematic and, in the technical literature, disputed.
Thus it has been pointed out, we think correctly, that also parlia-
mentary decisions which occurred against small minorities can
contain relevant information concerning lines of conflict and
determinants of the voting-behavior . Just as little is the presence of
representatives a reliable indicator of the importance of an issue.
One may think of the case, not rare, of the absence of representa-
tives in the case of votes which are "unpleasant" for them
. In such
a situation absence would even have to be estimated rather as an in-
dication of the importance of an issue.
The third type of selection-procedure rests solely upon the infor-
mation that a roll-call vote on an issue has taken place . Deliberate
selections according to certain political areas, such as financial
policy, foreign policy, military policy, traffic policy, etc . are
frequent . (87) Here, the subjective and, in borderline-cases, arbi-
trary classification of issues to political areas is problematic.
Even more important : The goal of the project presented here - a re-
construction of legislative behavior covering the whole thematic
wedth of parliamentary decision-making - would not be realized with
such a procedure
. These considerations justify the application of a
selection based on probability
. (88) It makes possible a reduction
of the extent of the inquiry in a degree to be determined by the
director of the project itself, without preliminary decisions on the
classification or "importance" of votes . Also, the field of
investigation is less biased than it would have been the case using other pro-
cedures . The decision as to whether a pure probability-selection or
a systematic chance-selection is to be applied cannot yet be made.
For this, still more information concerning the structure of the
basic totality must first be available . (For example, do certain
issues accumulate in certain sections of a legislative period?)
The extent of the sample will lie at ca . 20 % of the basic totality.
This means that about 1000 votes are covered in the gathering of
data . Our investigations into the voting-behavior in the Frankfurt
National Assembly, in which results on the basis of an inquiry into
all roll-call votes in one definite period of time were compared
with those of a 20 % random-sample, have shown that, in the case of
a data-reduction of this extent, the dimensions of the voting-beha-
vior are still represented in the data.
Besides the votes represented in the random sample, other parliamen-
tary decisions which are considered to be expecially important by
research are to be incorporated ("Sozialistengesetz", fleet budget,
etc .) . Against the background of the analyses of the "representative"
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voting-behavior, these "important" issues will be localized in the
topography of the political realm of decision.
3 .3 VOTING-DISTRICT DATA
Relationships between the system-levels of the voters and the elected
belong to the traditional subjects of research into parliamentaria-
nism
. In the past, this connection was discussed above all under the
aspect of the "best" form of parliamentary representation . Today on
the other hand, for a political sociology it is rather questions con-
cerning the factual mechanisms of mediation between the "will of the
voters" and the political process of decision which stand in the fore-
ground . (89) The plan presented here also takes up this posing of
the problem . We want to investigate to what extent and in what manner,
in German parliamentary history, social cleavages have effected the
political realm of decision and have influenced the capability of
parliamentary leadership-groups to make compromises, form coalitions
and to gain power . In our theoretical concept we have outlined two
lines of connecton between the system-levels of the voters and elec-
ted : 1) . an indirect influence of popular votes on legislative voting
-behavior via the recruitment of parliamentary leadership-groups in
the sense that the "social-moral milieus" sent representatives, with
different types of biographical "profiles", and 2) a direct influence
of the properties of the electorate on the behavior of representa
tives in such a manner that the perception of interests and expecta-
tions of the voters, via the anticipation of their voting-behavior,
effected the decisions of the elected . (90) For the past, even with
an extensive exhaustion of written sources, the perception of voter-
opinions by the representatives cannot be reconstructed with the re-
quired completeness and precision. On the other hand, data on the politi-
cal preferences of the voters are to be gathered without problems
for almost the whole period of time under investigation : From 1871
on the voting-results and a series of demographical characteristics
(population-number, number of those having the right to vote, distri-
bution of confessions, economical structure) on the level of the vot-
ing-district are available in machine-readable form for all legisla-
tive periods
. Even though these data allow no direct inferences on
the psychology of legislative voting-behavior, they still give us in-
formation on relevant properties of a context which is of great
importance for the representatives . This evaluation is supported by
the intensive contemporary discussion about voting-results and about
the connection between the structure of the electorate and its
political preferences
. (91) In the Empire, additionally, the anticipation
of voting-results on the level of the voting-district played a central
roll in the working-out of second ballot-agreements . (92)
The connecting of voting-district data and individual characteristics
of representatives follows an approach which Erwin K . Scheuch de
signed as "options analysis" . (93) This is a multi - level
approach, in which the higher of two levels of investigation is
interpreted as a subjectively relevant surrounding-world ("Umwelt") for
the units of the lower level
. The "costs" of the options of indivi-
dual actors are then determined by the reactions, perceived by them,
of relevant surrounding-worlds on their decisions . In contrast to
"pooled-analysis", in which context-variables, as part of the set of
characteristics of a person, are treated in the same manner as their
individual characteristics, the "options-analysis" presupposes the
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reactivity of the relationship between "surrounding-world" and actor.
With a view to the connection between voting-district and represen-
tative this implies : We expect that the representative orientates
his political action c . p . on the (voting-) behavior of the electo-
rate which, in turn, reacts on the voting-behavior of its represen-
tatives . In the concrete case it will have to be asked, among other
things, in which way popular voting-results at the level of the voting-
district effected legislative voting-behavior . For example, did repre-
sentatives of the Zentrum elected in voting-districts with large social-
democratic (respectively Protestant) minorities behave differently from
those elected in voting-districts with large liberal or conservative mi-
norities (respectively purely Catholic population)? Did the safety of
his voting-district effect the representatives voting-behavior? How
did such connections change in the course of time, in particular after
the Voting Law of the Weimar Republic had dissolved the direct ties
between representatives anti their individual voting-districts?
The incorporation of voting-district data demands no further data-
gathering, since, for almost the whole period of time under
investigation, voting-results and additional voting-district data in machine-
readable form can be obtained through the Zentrum für historische
Sozialforschung from the holdings of the ICPSR . The exceptions are
the Frankfurt and Weimar National Assembly, the North German
Reichstages and the Zollparlament, for which (presently) no equivalent
collections of data are available . In the case of the Frankfurt National
Assembly, an exhaustive reconstruction of voting-district data may
be impossible because of the loss of the vote-protocols . However,
we are of the opinion that the relationship between the system-levels
of the voters and the elected can be investigated with sufficient
empirical density on the basis of the available data-bases.
FOOTNOTES
Thanks to George Heffernan who has done most of the work to trans-
late the manuscript.
1 For Germany this is documented by a series of publications out of
the 1920's and 1930's:
Walther Kamm,. Abgeordnetenberufe und Parlament . Ein Beitrag zur So-
ziologie des Parlamentarismus, Karlsruhe 1927 ; Louis Rosenbaum,
Beruf und Herkunft der Abgeordenten zu den deutschen und preußischen
Parlamenten 1847-1919 . Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des deutschen
Parlaments, Frankfurt a . M. 1923 ; Adolf Borell, Die soziologische
Gliederung des Reichsparlaments als Ausdruck der politischen und
ökonomischen Konstellationen, (Diss
.) Gießen 1933 ; Willy Kramer,
Der soziale Aufbau der Parteien des deutschen Reichstages von 1871
-1918, (Diss .)Köln/Emstetten 1934 ; G . Benshausen, Zur
Strukturanalyse parlamentarischer Repräsentation in Deutschland vor der
Gründung des Norddeutschen Bundes, (Diss .) Hamburg 1926.
2 Cf . e . g . : Lester Seligman, Recruiting Political Elites, New York
1971 ; John Jackson, Constituencies and Leaders in Congress, Cam-
- 47 -
bridge/Mass . 1974 ; Wendell Bell, Richard J . Hill and Charles R.
Wright, Public Leadership, San Francisco 1961 ; John W. Kingdon,
Candidates for Office, New York 1968 ; James David Barber, The
Lawmakers
. Recruitment and Adaption to Legislative Life, New
Haven/London 1967 ; Peter Gerlich and Helmut Kramer, Abgeordnete
in der Parteiendemokratie, München 1969.
3 Examples of investigations with a methodologically differentiated
approach are : Mary P . Ryan, "Party Formation in the United States
Congress, 1789 to 1796 . A Quantitative Analysis", in : WMQ, Vol.
28, No
. 4 (Oct . 1971), pp . 493-542 and John F . Hoadley, "The Emer-
gence of Political Parties in Congress, 1789-1803", in : The Ameri-
can Political Science Review, Vol . 74, No . 3 (1980), pp . 757-799.
It is true that rather descriptive-"qualitative" approaches are
usual . As examples of a plurality of works cf . the passages on the
formation of parties in : Heino Kaack, Geschichte und Struktur des
deutschen Parteiensystems, Opladen 1971 and David Truman, The Con-
gressional Party, New York 1959.
4 Cf . e . g . : Aage B . Clausen, How Congressmen Decide, New York 1973;
Cleo Cherryholmes and Michael Shapiro, Representatives and Roll
Calls, Indianopolis 1969 ; John W . Kingdon, "Congressmen's Voting
Decisions", in : The Journal of Politics, Vol . 39, No . .3 (1977),
pp . 563-595 ; Thimothy M . Hennessy and Jeanne Martin, "Exchange
Theory and Parliamentary Instability", in : Allan Kornberg (ed .),
Legislatures in Comparative Perspective, New York 1973, pp . 182-
202 and John G . Grumm, "The Legislative System as an Economic
Model", in : ibid ., pp . 235-249.
5 Jerome M . Clubb, "The Historical Analytical Approach", in : Donald
M . Freeman (ed .), Foundation of Political Science, New York 1977,
p . 654 ff . and William O . Aydelotte (ed .), The History of Parlia-
mentary Behavior (Introduction), Princeton/N .J . 1977, p . 3 ff ..
6A comparative approach is pursued by, e . g., E . Ozbun, Party Cohe
-
sion in Western Democracy, Beverly Hills 1970 and (on the factio-
nalization of parliaments) Douglas Rae, The Political Consequences
of Electoral Laws, New Haven 1968 . A synopsis of results from dif-
ferent parliamentary systems, without a comprehensive, comparative
conception of research, is given by the contributions in : Gerhard
Loewenberg (ed .), Modern Parliaments : Change or Decline?, Chicago
1971 and Komberg, Legislatures . An early example of a systematical-
ly comparative procedure is : A . Lawrence Lowell, Governments and
Parties in Continental Europe, Cambridge/Mass . 1896.
7 Thus, e . g ., in : J . Blondel, Comparative Legislatures, Englewood
Cliffs/N .J . 1973 . Cf . also Seymour Lipset and Stein Rokkan, Party
Systems and Voter Alignments, New York 1967, which, for the investi-
gation of the genesis and location of political cleavages in Western
and Central Europe, restricts its observations in the area of par-
liaments to the numerical strengths of factions.
8 A time-series analysis on the basis of a consistent data-basis has
been carried out by Morgens N . Pedersen . Cf . "The Personal Circula-
tion of a Legislature : The Danish Folketing, 1849-1968", in : William
O . Aydelott,History, pp . 63-101 . An example of a fusion of research
-results from various historical individual studies is : W . L . Cutts-
man, "The British Political Elite and the Class Structure", in the
volume edited by Philip Stanworth and Anthony Giddens, Elites and
Power in British Society, Cambridge 1974, pp . 22-44 . Cf . also the
contributions in Allan Konnberg and Lloyd D . Musloff (eds .), Legisla-
- 48 -
tures in Developmental Perspective . On the cognitive potential of
time-series analyses of parliamentary decision-making processes,
cf . Clubb, Approach, p . 654 ff.
9 SS Data, Vol . 8, No . 2 (1979), p . 4 ff.
Despite the favorable data-situation in the USA, here too the
analysis of parliamentary decision-making processes is done for
the most part as "episodic individual research" . Cf . Joel H.
Silberg, "Congressional and State Legislative Roll-Call Studies By
U .S . Historians", in: Legislative Studies Quarterly, Vol . 4, (1981),
pp . 597-607.
10 Cf . Gerhard Loewenberg, "Comparative Legislative Research", in:
Samuel C . Patterson and John S . Wahlke (eds .), Comparative Legis-
lative Behavior : Frontiers of Research, New York 1972, p . 14 ff ..
An example of a methodologically differentiated combination of
social background-variables and voting-data is : Peter H . Smith,
"The Making of the Mexican Constitution", in : Aydelotte, History,
pp . 186-224.
11 On this cf . : L . J . Edinger and D . D . Searing, "Social Background
in Elite Analysis : A Methodological Inquiry", in : APSR, Vol . 61
(1967), pp . 428-445 and Uwe Schleth, "Once again : Does it pay to
study social background in elite analysis?", in: Sozialwissen-
schaftliches Jahrbuch für Politik, Vol . 2 (1971), pp . 99-118 . Cf.
also William O . Aydelotte, Introduction, p . 17 f.
12 For the USA cf. the investigations of James H . Kuklinski
and Richard C . Elling, "Representational Role, Constituency Opinion
and Legislative Roll-Call Behavior", in : American Journal of
Political Science, 21 (1977)m pp. 135-147; Warren E. Miller and Donald
E . Stokes, "Constituency Influency in Congress", in : American Po-
litical Science Review, 57 (1963), pp . 45-56 and Morris Fiorina,
Representatives, Roll-Calls and Constituencies, Lexington/Mass.
1974.
13 On this cf . Heinrich Best, "Die regionale Differenzierung
interessenpolitischer Orientierungen im frühindustriellen Deutschland
- Ihre Ursachen und ihre Auswirkungen auf parlamentarische
Entscheidungsprozesse", in : Rainer Fremdling and Richard H . Tilly
(eds .), Industrialisierung und Raum - Studien zur regionalen Dif-
ferenzierung im Deutschland des 19 . Jahrhunderts, Stuttgart 1979,
pp . 251-282.
14 On the data-situation, summarizing, SS Data, Vol . 8, No . 3 (1979),
p . 4 f . and European Political Data Newsletter, Vol . 20 (1976),
RECR: 9-15 and Vol . 23-24 (1977), RECR : 9 f..
15. Kjell A . Eliassen with Jarle Brosveet, "Politikeraktivitet 1814-
1876 : Problemstillinger og analyseforslag", Bergen : NSD Handboker
Nr . 1, 1977 ; Hans Daalder and Jerrold G . Rusk, "Perceptions of
Party in the Dutch Parliament", in : Samuel C . Patterson and John
C . Wahlke (eds .), Comparative Legislative Behavior, pp . 143-198;
Erich Gruner, Die Parteien in der Schweiz . Bern 1969; Dieter Stie-
fel, "Structure of Generations in Austrian Parliaments 1919-1979",
in : Historical Social Research, No . 21 (1982), pp . 4-11.
16 Compare footnote 14.
17 Gerhard A . Ritter observes a "very unsatisfactory state of re-
search" : "Entwicklungsprobleme des Deutschen Parlamentarismus",
in : idem, Arbeiterbewegung, Parteien und Parlamentarismus, Göt-
tingen 1976, p . 159.
It is symptomatic that, in the reader edited by William O
. Aydelotte,
- 49 -
The History of Parliamentary Behavior, in which research-studies
are presented on parliaments of France, the USA, Great Britain
and the Scandinavian countries, no contribution on Germany is
	
-
contained.
18 Cf ., e . g ., Max Weber, "Parlament und Regierung im neugeordneten
Deutschland", in: Gesammelte politische Schriften, Tübingen 1971,
pp . 306-443 and Robert Michels, Zur Soziologie des Parteiwesens,
Leipzig 1911.
19 A rare exception is : Frank W . Dishaw, "Roll Call Vote Deviancy
of the CDU/CSU Fraktion in the West German Bundestag", in : Sozial-
wissenschaftliches Jahrbuch für Politik, Vol .2 (1971), pp . 539-
561 . On the first Bundestage cf . also : Heinz Markmann, Das Abstim-
mungsverhalten der Parteifraktionen in deutschen Parlamenten, Mei-
lenheim am Glan 1955 und Jürgen Domes, Mehrheitsfraktion und Bun-
desregierung, Köln/Opladen 1964.
20 Donald J . Mattheisen, "Liberal Constitutionalism in the Frankfurt
Parliament of 1848 : An Inquiry Based on Roll Call Analysis", in:
Central European History, Vol . 12, No . 2 (1979), pp . 124-142.
21 Idem, "Die Fraktionen der preußischen Nationalversammlung von
1848", in : Konrad Jarausch (ed.), Quantifizierung in der Geschichts-
wissenschaft . Probleme und Möglichkeiten, Düsseldorf 1976, pp.
149-167.
22 James Harris, "Parteigruppierungen im konstituierenden Reichstag
des Norddeutschen Bundes von 1867", in : Jarausch, Quantifizierung,
pp . 168-175.
23 Idem, "Broadening the Scope : A Computer Analysis of the German
Reichstag (1867-1884)", in : Historical Methods Newsletter, Vol . 4
(1971), pp . 78-84 ; Jeoffrey H . Loesch, "The Application of Roll-
Call Analysis to the Study of German Parliamentary History" . Paper
presented to the Study Group on Quantification in German History,
American Historical Association Convention, December, 1973.
24 Helmut Norpoth, Sources of Party Cohesion in the U .S . House of
Representatives (unpubl . Ph . D . diss .), University of Michigan
1974 ; Harald Thomas, Die Westexpansion der USA und das Auseinan -
derbrechen des zweiten amerikanischen Parteiensystems (unpubl.
Ph . D . diss .), Köln 1982.
25 Wilhelm H . Schröder, "Probleme und Methoden der quantitativen
Analyse von kollektiven Biographien . Das Beispiel der sozialdemo-
kratischen Reichstagskandidaten (1898-1912)", in : Heinrich Best
and Reinhard Mann (eds.), Quantitative Methoden in der historisch
-sozialwissehschaftlichen Forschung, Stuttgart 1977, pp . 8-125.
26 In the mid-1970's the state of historical research into parliamen-
tarianism was documented in two volumes edited by Gerhard A.
Ritter : Die deutschen Parteien vor 1918, Köln 1973,
	
and Gesellschaft,
Parlament und Regierung . Zur Geschichte des Parlamentarismus in
Deutschland, Düsseldorf 1974 . Cf . also Peter Molt, Der Reichstag
vor der improvisierten Revolution, Köln/Opladen 1963 and the list
of publications of the Kommission für Geschichte des Parlamenta-
rismus und der politischen Parteien.
In the investigations of the structure of historical elites in
Germany which are presented by social scientists, parliamentarians
are treated either not at all or only as a subordinate subjects .
- 50 -
Cf ., among others, Ralf Dahrendorf, Gesellschaft und Demokratie
in Deutschland, München 1968 ; Maxwell E . Knight, The German Exe-
cutive 1890-1933, Stanford 1952 ; Wolfgang Zapf, Wandlungen der
deutschen Elite . Ein Zirkulationsmodell deutscher Führungsgruppen
1919-1960, München 1965.
In opposition to this, the empirical investigation of political
elites in the Federal Republic of Germany has placed a strong em-
phasis on parliamentary leadership-groups, whereby attention is
directed above all to their inter-locking with other political
and social "functional areas" . On the current research-situation
cf ., among others, Heino Kaack, "Zur Struktur der politischen
Führungselite in Parteien, Parlament und Regierung", in : Handbuch
des deutschen Parteiensystems, Vol
. 1 : Parteistrukturen und Legi-
timation des Parteiensystems, Opladen 1980, p
. 195 f..
Without claiming a systematic consideration of the existing
literature, cf. also: Klaus von Beyme, Die politische Elite in der
Bundesrepublik Deutschland, München 1971 ; Dietrich Herzog,
Politische Karrieren. Selektion und Professionalisierung politischer
Führungsgruppen, Opladen 1975 ; Werner Kaltefleiter, "The
Recruitment Market of the German Political Elite", in : Heinz Eulau and
Moshe M. Czudnowski (eds .), Elite Recruitment in Democratic
Polities, New York 1976; idem and Rudolf Wildenmann (eds.), Westdeut-
sche Führungsschicht
. Eine sozialwissenschaftliche Untersuchung
der Inhaber von Führungspositonen (Tabellenband), Bonn 1973 ; Ru-
dolf Wildenmann, Eliten in der Bundesrepublik . Eine sozialwissen-
schaftliche Untersuchung über Einstellungen führender
Positionsträger zu Politik und Demokratie, Mannheim 1968.
27 Emil Lederer, "Probleme des deutschen Parlamentarismus", in : idem,
Kapitalismus, Klassenstruktur und Probleme der Demokratie in
Deutschland 1910-1940, Göttingen 1980, pp . 186-198.
28 On the relative autonomy of the elite-system vis-a-vis the social
system and on the structural analysis of German leadership groups
cf . : Erwin K
. Scheuch, Das sichtbare Establishment und das unsicht-
bare System der Macht, Mimeo
. 1968 and idem, "Soziologie der Macht",
in : Hans K . Schneider and Christian Watrin (eds .), Macht und ökono-
misches Gesetz, Berlin 1973, pp
. 989-1042.
29 Cf . : M. Rainer Lepsius, "Parteiensystem und Sozialstruktur . Zum
Problem der Demokratisierung der deutschen Gesellschaft", and
James J . Sheehan, "Politische Führung im deutschen Reichstag, 1871
-1918", in : Gerhard A . Ritter (ed .), Deutsche Parteien vor 1918,
pp . 56-99.
30 Cf ., among others, Adolf M . Birke, "Wahlrechtsreform und Wählerbe-
wegung in England . Zum Verhältnis von Parlamentarismus und Demo-
kratisierung in der Viktorianischen Zeit", in: Otto Büsch (ed .),
Wählerbewegung in der europäischen Geschichte, Berlin 1980, pp.
211-225 and Gerhard A . Ritter, "Deutscher und britischer Parlamen-
tarismus
. Ein verfassungsgeschichtlicher Vergleich", in : idem,
Arbeiterbewegung, p . 195 ff..
31 This is a central category of Lasswell's "genetic" elite-theory.
On this compare Daniel Lerner, Harold D . Lasswell and C . Easton
Rothwell, The Comparative Study of Elites : An Introduction and
Bibliography, Stanford 1951.
32 Les Sommets de l'Etat : essai sur l'élite du pouvoir en France,
Paris 1977 .
- 51 -
33 Charles Kadushin, Richard Alba and Gwen Moore, Network Studies of
National Elite Systems, mimeo August 1977, p . 44.
34 Ibid ., p . 20.
35 Cf . the introduction to : Citizens, Elections Partys, Oslo 1970,
p . 102 ff . and idem, "Models and Methods in the Comparative Study
of Nation-Building", in : Acta Sociologica, Vol . 12 (1969), pp.
53-73 ; Helmuth Plessner, Die verspätete Nation, Stuttgart 1959.
36 M . Rainer Lepsius, Parteiensystem ; Hans-Ulrich Wehler, Das
Deutsche Kaiserreich 1871-1918, Göttingen 1977, p . 78 ff ..
37 Franz Urban Pappi, "Sozialstruktur, Gesellschaftliche Wertorien -
tierungen und Wahlabsicht", in : PVS 18 (1977), p . 195 . Arthur L.
Stinchcombe, "Social Structure and Politics", in : Fred I . Green-
stein and Nelson W . Polsby (eds .), Macro-Political Theory, Vol.
3 of the Handbook of Political Science, Reading/Mass . 1975, pp.
557-622.
38 Gerhard A . Ritter, Kontinuität, p . 434, fn . 47.
39 On the structural crisis of German parliamentarianism in the Wei-
mar Republic cf . : M . Rainer Lepsius, "From Fragmented Party De-
mocracy to Government by Emergency Decree and Nationalsocialist
Takeover : Germany", in : Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan (eds .), The
Breakdown of Democratic Regimes, Baltimore and London 1978, Part
II, pp . 34-80 (also, further literature here).
40 In : Gesammelte Abhandlungen, Vol . 1, Göttingen 1970 3 , pp . 359-389.
41 Ibid ., p . 377 ff . . Similarly, but less pregnantly formulated,
this idea is also found in Max Weber, Parlament und Regierung, p.
384 : "In industrial countries a two-party system is impossible
simply as a result of the splitting of the modern economicclasses into
bourgeois classes and proletariat and as a result of the signifi-
cance of socialism as gospel of the masses . There is so to say a
"confessional" barrier . Thus above all among us . The organization
of Catholicism further, as a party which protects a minority,
following from the relationships between the confessions in Germany,
will, among us, . . . be eliminated with difficulty . Thus at least
four, but probably five large parties will exist among us side
by side for a long time, coalition-governments will remain a ne-
cessity and the power of a prudently operating crown will remain
always significant ."
42 Friedrich Naumann, Demokratie und Kaisertum . Ein Handbuch für
innere Politik, Berlin 1905, p . 54.
43 Connected therewith is a process of rapid "defactionalization" of
the German Bundestage . Cf . Frank Dishaw, "Bemerkungen zur Konkur-
renz im deutschen Parteiensystem 1871-1969", in : Sozialwissen-
schaftliches Jahrbuch für Politik, Vol . 2 (1971), pp . 61-72 . How-
ever, this should not be taken to mean that the traditional lines
of tension had completely lost their significance for the shaping
of the political culture in the Federal Republic . It is precisely
religious orientations which display a remarkable stability . It is
true that, today, no conflicts arise out of this which, in their
intensity, could be compared, e . g ., to the "Kulturkampf" . Cf.
on this Franz Urban Pappi, "Konstanz und Wandel der Hauptspannungs -
linien in der Bundesrepublik", in : Joachim Matthes (ed .), Sozialer
Wandel in Westeuropa, Verhandlungen des 19 . Deutschen Soziologen-
- 52 -
tages, Frankfurt 1979, pp . 465-500.
44 Wilhelm Hennis, "Parteienstruktur und Regierbarkeit", in : idem,
Peter Graf Kielmannsegg and Ulrich Matz, Regierbarkeit . Studien
zu ihrer Problematisierung, Vol . 1, Stuttgart 1977.
45 Cf. Peter Hoschka and Hermann Schlucht, "Stabilität regionaler
Wählerstrukturen in der Bundesrepublik", in : PVS 18 (1977), p.
280.
46 On the persistence of the party-system in most western European
countries, cf . : Symour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan, "Cleavage
Structures, Party Systems and Voter Alignments", in : idem, Party
Systems and Voter Alignments, p . 50 f.
On certain points our model orientates itself on the theoretical
considerations which were proposed by the "Research Group on Com-
parative Political Leadership" (Carl Beck, William A . Welsh, et
al .) . Cf . Carl Beck et al ., Comparative Communist Political Lea-
dership, New York 1973, Introduction ; William A . Welsh, Leaders
and Elites, New York 1979, p . 41.
For quite a long time now the assumption of a direct relationship
between structural properties of society and type of power-orga-
nization belongs to the theoretical repertoire of American com-
munity-research . Cf. Erwin K . Scheuch, Soziologie der Macht, p.
1010 ff.
47 Cf . Carl Beck, Introduction and William A . Welsh, Leaders and
Elites, p . 47 ff ..
48 Samuel C . Patterson and John C . Wahlke, "Trends and Prospects in
Legislative Behavior Research", in : idem, Comparative Legislative
Behavior, p . 299 ff.
49 Cf . Juan J . Linz, "Crisis, Breakdown and Equilibrium", in : idem
and Alfred Stepan, The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes, pp . 66-69.
50 It is, from their standpoint of the theory of science, inconsistent
- although not unusual - that precisely the proponents of a mate-
rialistic philosophy of history are in the habit of morally
disqualifying the behavior of the bourgeois leadership-groups . As
one example from among many, cf . : Walter Schmidt, "Zur Rolle der
Bourgeoisie in den Revolutionen von 1789 und 1848", in : ZFG, Vol.
21 (1973), p . 301-320.
51 Erwin K . Scheuch, "Auswahlverfahren in der Sozialforschung", in:
René König (ed .), Handbuch der empirischen Sozialforschung, Vol.
3a, Stuttgart 1974 3 , p . 12.
52 Cf . Michael Rush, "The Members of Parliament", in : S .A . Walkland
(ed .), The House of Commons in the Tweentieth Century, Oxfort
1979, pp . 69-123 ; J .A . Thomas, House of Commons 1832-1901, Car-
diff 1939 ; Molt, Reichstag, tables 3-9, pp . 76, 78, 89, 92, 111,
129 . Cf . also Erwin K. Scheuch, Continuity and Change, p . 154.
53 On the methodological problems cf . Karl-Heinz Reuband, "Life
Histories : Problems and Prospects of Longitudinal Designs", in : Je-
rome M . Clubb and Erwin K . Scheuch (eds .), Historical Social Re-
search . The Use of Historical and Process-Produced Data, Stutt-
gart 1980, pp . 135-163.
54M . Rainer Lepsius, Parteiensystem.
55 Harold D . Lasswell, Study.
56 Carl Beck and James Malloy, "Political Elites : A Mode of Analysis",
Paper delivered at the Sixth World Conference, International
Political Science Association, Geneva 1964 .
- 53 -
57 Max Weber, Parlament und Regierung, pp . 364 ff ..
58 Harold D . Lasswell, Study.
59 Cf . Ritter, Entwicklungsprobleme, p . 158 ; cf. also Walther Keim,
"Von Beruf MDB - Zur Sozialstruktur des Deutschen Bundestages",
in : Der Bürger im Staat, Jg . 26, H . 2 (1976), p . 101.
60 Molt, Reichstag, Table 4, p . 78.
61 Kamm, Abgeordnetenberufe, Table 1, p . 11.
62 Calculated accordings to Emil Peter Müller, Die sozio-ökonomische
und verbandliche Struktur des VIII . Deutschen Bundestages, Köln
1977, Table IV, p . 18 (including members of the government).
63 Thomas D . Beck, French Legislators 1800-1834 . A Study
in Quantitative History, Berkeley 1974.
64 Max Schwarz, MDR (Mitglied des Reichstages) : Biographisches Hand-
buch der Reichstage, Hannover 1965.
65 Wilhelm Heinz Schröder, "Quantitative Analyses of Collective Life
Histories", in: Jerome M . Clubb and Erwin K . Scheuch (eds .), His-
torical Social Research, p . 203-224.
66 Duncan McRae Jr ., "Some Underlying Variables in Legislative Roll-
Call Votes", in : Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol . 18, No . 2 (1954),
p . 191-196.
67 On the problematic cf . Reinhard Figge, Die Opposition der NSDAP
im Reichstag, (Diss . rer . pol .) Köln 1963.
68 Duncan McRae Jr ., Issues and Parties in Legislative Voting . Me-
thods of Statistical Analysis, New York 1970, p . 1 ff . ; William
O . Aydelotte, Introduction, p . 3 ff ..
69 Ibid ., p . 4.
70 Ibid, p . 13 ; Aage R . Clausen, "The Measurement of Legislative
Group Behavior", in : Midwest Journal of Political Science, Vol.
11, No . 2 (1967), pp . 212-224.
71 Calculated according to Heinz Markmann, Das Abstimmungsverhalten
der Parteifraktionen in deutschen Parlamenten, Meisenheim am Glan
1955.
72 Cf . among others Helmut Kramer, Fraktionsbindungen in den deut-
schen Volksvertretungen 1819-1849, Berlin 1968, p . 74 ff.
73 Cf . : Molt, Reichstag ; Markmann, Abstimmungsverhalten.
74 Calculated according to Emil Obermann, Alter und Konstanz von
Fraktionen, Meisenheim am Clan 1955, pp . 14-31.
75 Cf . : Molt, Reichstag ; Lepsius, Fragmented Party Democracy, p . 41 ff ..
76 Cf . : Patterson and Wahlke, Trends and Prospects.
77 Cf . among others : Aydelotte, Introduction.
78 Cf . Duncan McRay Jr ., "Dimensions of Congressional Voting", in:
University Publications in Sociology and Social Institutions, Vol.
1, No . 3 (1958), pp . 203-390.
79 Kingdon, Models of Legislative Voting, p . 564 ff..
80 Ibid, p . 575.
81 Duncan McRae Jr ., "The Sociology of Legislatures", in : I1 Politico,
- 54 -
Vol . 32, No . 3 (1967), pp . 578-589 ; idem, Issues and Parteis, p.
39 ff ..
82 Aage R . Clausen, "Response Validity in Surveys
. Response Validity:
_Vote Report", in : Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol
. 32 (1968), pp.
588-606 ; Fred I . Greenstein and Alton F
. Jackson, "A Second Look
at the Validity of Roll Call Analysis", in : Midwest Journal of
Political Science, Vol
. 7, No . 2 (1963), pp . 156-166.
83 Erwin K
. Scheuch and Helmut Zehnpfennig, "Skalierungsverfahren in
der Sozialforschung", in : René König, Handbuch der empirischen
Sozialforschung, Vol . 3a, Stuttgart 1974 3 , p . 168.
84 Aage R . Clausen, "Some Basic Approaches to the Measurement of Roll-
Call-Voting", in : Freeman, Foundation of Political Science, pp.
313-345.
85 Lee F . Anderson et al
., Legislative Roll-Call Analysis, Evanstone
1966, p . 123 ff ..
86 William H
. Riker, "A Method for Determining the Significance of
Roll Calls in Voting Bodies", in: John C . Wahlke and Heinz Eulau
(eds .), Legislative Behavior, New York 1959.
87 Anderson et al ., Legislative Roll-Call Analysis, p
. 78.
88 Ibid, p . 78 ff.
89 Cf. John C
. Wahlke, "Policy Demands and System Support : The Role
of the Represented", in : Gerhard Loewenberg (ed .), Modern Parlia-
ments : Change or Decline?, Chicago and New York 1971, pp . 141-171.
90 Warren E
. Miller and Donald E . Stokes, "Constituence Influence in
Congress", in: Americal Political Science Review, Vol . 57 (1963),
pp . 45-56.
91 On this cf . the contemporary analyses of the behavior of voters in
the Empire in : Otto Basch et al . (eds .), Wählerbewegung in der deut-
schen Geschichte, Berlin 1978.
92 The significance of second-ballot votes for the behavior of voters
and for election facties in the Empire is still, for the most part,
uninvestigated
. Cf . a contribution to the discussion by Alfred
Milatz, in : Otto Basch (ed .), Wählerbewegung in der europäischen
Geschichte, p . 207.
92 Cf . Erwin K. Scheuch, "Social Context and Individual Behavior",
in : Matthei Dogan and Stein Rokkan (eds .), Quantitative Ecological
Analysis in the Social Sciences, Cambridge/Mass . 1969, p . 141 ff . .
